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Philosophers and historians of science have long been engaged in discussing the importance of the 1935 
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paper (EPR) arguing for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics, and Bohr’s 
immediate response to this critique.  Very few are aware, however, of a response to EPR written by 
Heisenberg in Leipzig at the same time Bohr was crafting his more famous response in Copenhagen.   
 
After the EPR paper was published in Physical Review, Pauli wrote to Heisenberg, suggesting that 
Heisenberg develop his own response to EPR, despite the fact that Bohr was already working on a draft.  
The implication was that, as Pauli well knew, Heisenbergwould likely provide a rather different 
argument in defense of quantum mechanics (or, rather, against the possibility of ever rendering it 
"complete", as the authors of EPR desired) than the sort of tactics it was assumed Bohr would employ 
against this criticism of the theory.   
 
Heisenberg took up Pauli's suggestion.  On July 2, 1935 he replied to Pauli's letter, enclosing a draft of 
his response to EPR, titled: “Ist eine deterministische Ergänzung der Quantenmechanik möglich?”  This 
paper would never be published, save for a transcription, in German, in the multi-volume collection of 
Pauli's scientific correspondence (K. von Meyenn 1985). 
 
I recently completed the first English translation of this work of Heisenberg's, and have found that it is 
fascinating not only in its historical significance as a defense of quantum mechanics quite different from 
Bohr's (thereby providing further ammunition against the so-called “Copenhagen interpretation”), but 
furthermore, it is a document rich with philosophical implications.  For example, Heisenberg’s response 
does not focus on the gedankenexperiment presented by EPR, as does Bohr's; rather, Heisenberg frames 
his defense of the completeness of quantum mechanics in terms of the more difficult conceptual 
question concerning the placement of the “cut” between classical descriptions of physical processes and 
quantum mechanical descriptions.   
 
Though Heisenberg had spoken of the "cut" several times in the years prior to 1935 and would continue 
to use this specific argument in writings and lectures afterward, it is within his response to EPR that we 
find the most carefully laid-out and detailed description of this argument.   Furthermore, it is within the 
wider context of Heisenberg's cut argument as presented in his 1935 that we find also his fullest 
argumentation against the possibility of hidden variables—a potential remedy postulated by de Broglie 
(1926), Einstein (1927) and others to resolve the perceived incompleteness of quantum mechanics. 
 
A detailed exploration of Heisenberg's response to EPR promises to yield a rich and varied harvest; 
however, it is a harvest that exceeds the limitations of one talk.  In this presentation, I focus on 
Heisenberg's thinking regarding hidden variables in the period from 1927 to 1935.  My investigation will 
take Heisenberg's treatment of hidden variables in the EPR draft as central, but will consider more 
broadly the conceptual space that led Heisenberg to the specific no-go argument developed in response 
to EPR.  In order to clarify this conceptual space, I will consider three relevant aspects of Heisenberg's 
thought from 1927 to 1935 that merge to form his best-articulated argument against the possibility of 
hidden variables.  These three aspects are as follows: (i) Heisenberg's earliest no-go argument, which 
targeted Einstein's 1927 unpublished paper on hidden-variables, (ii) the central role of interference 
phenomena in Heisenberg's approach, and (iii) the cut argument, which Heisenberg believes ultimately 
demonstrates the incompleteable nature of quantum mechanics, granting only its most fundamental 
assumptions. 
 
By investigating the connection between these three crucial components in Heisenberg's thinking prior 
to EPR and the response to EPR itself, some striking features of this argument emerge.  One significant 
feature of Heisenberg's work on hidden variables in 1935 concerns a matter of historical priority:  it 
appears that in his draft, Heisenberg makes explicit for the first time in the literature the importance of 
assumptions regarding the context dependence of hidden variables.  As far as my historical work 
reveals, Heisenberg's separate treatment of a case wherein hidden variables depend on context versus 
the usual case, in which the hidden variables are assumed to be independent of observational context, 
anticipates Bell's (1966) famous realization concerning these two separate "classes" of hidden variables 
theories by nearly thirty years.  The argument Heisenberg eventually gives against context-dependent 
hidden variables is hand-wavy at best; yet the historical point remains.   
 
The argument he deploys against the existence of the usual, context-independent hidden variables is 
not much good, either.  However, one is struck upon closer analysis of these arguments that despite 
their shortcomings, Heisenberg has nevertheless done something quite novel in developing them—
something that none of his contemporaries had attempted, or perhaps even appreciated.  My 
collaborator Guido Bacciagaluppi and I (forthcoming) have concluded, based on examination of 
Heisenberg and comparing his work to other no-go arguments being put forward at the time, that 
Heisenberg's particular approach is significantly distinct from the usual method employed by, for 
example, von Neumann in his Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik, Pauli, Schrödinger, 
and Grete Hermann—a neo-Kantian philosopher and student of Emmy Noether's who visited Leipzig 
during the early 1930's and who, after many interactions with both Heisenberg and von Weizsäcker, 
composed one of (if not the) first philosophical treatises on quantum mechanics.   
 
The second part of my presentation will serve as a historical sketch of "fashionable" no-go arguments 
for hidden variables employed by these four important figures.  A comparison will then expose the 
difference of approach adopted by Heisenberg. Bacciagaluppi and I argue that Heisenberg's surprisingly 
unique treatment of hidden variables aids us in understanding why it was Heisenberg who first grasped 
the importance of the assumption of context dependence.  We further argue that it is the unique 
character of this argument that may resolve certain historical puzzles regarding Heisenberg's 1935 draft 
and the response (or lack thereof) to it.  
